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TAX POLICY AND INVESTMENT
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we summarize recent advances in the study of effects of tax policy on the fixed
investment decisions of firms. We attempt to identify consensus where it has been achieved and to
highlight important unresolved issues. In addition, we discuss the implications of recent findings
for the analysis of policy options, and discuss arguments for and against long-run tax policy that
favors business investment spending.
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“The~rst ship to arrive in St. Petersburg in 1701, a Dutch vessel, receivedfiom Peter the Great the
privilege of paying no custom duties for the rest of its physical life --a concession which had the
e~ect of prolonging the ship 5 ll~efor almost a century -- three orfour times the normal span.”1
I. Introduction
Just as Peter the Great’s tax amnesty spurred substantial maintenance investment in that
Dutch ship, many governments have apparently believed that tax policy can be used as an instrument
to alter firms’ capital investment decisions. Indeed, investment w credits (ITCS), special investment
“reseme” tids, or accelerated depreciation allowances have been the rule rather than the exception
in most developed countries since World War II. Against this backdrop, however, economists have
generally struggled to find a significant impact of tax policy on investment.
I
The empirical economic literature on investment finds its early ~oots in the work of Afialian
(1909), Clark (191 7), and Fisher (1930). Aftalian and Clark observed that business investment is
highly correlated with changes in business output -- providing support for the early “accelerationist”
school -- while Fisher’s neoclassical theory argued for the importance of marginal conditions. At
the risk of oversimpli&ing, the literature subsequently divided into two camps. One side argued that
the “accelerator” model pefiormed so well empirically that it should be adopted as the standard
model, the other side looked to “neoclassical” models relating investment to the user cost of capital.
While the neoclassical school may have had the theoretical high ground, empirical implementations
of neoclassical models have been generally disappointing. Indeed, while the time-series evidence
has always revealed that lags of output are highly correlated with investment, interest rates have
1See Braudel (1992, page 241).L
provided very limited additional explanatory power. 2 The debate between these two schools
provides a usefil introduction to our review of the literature relating tax policy to investment. Many
obsewers even recently (e.g., Clark, 1993) have argued that tax policy likely does not significantly
affect investment, and the arguments inevitably harken back to the accelerationist debate.
Motivated by the hope that the simplest neoclassical models failed to explain investment
fluctuations because they were too stylized, substantial energy was devoted to the task of extending
these models to incorporate more realistic assumptions in the 1970s and early 1980s.3 Chief among
these was the incorporation of costs of adjusting the capital stock. According to these models,
investment is forward-looking, and based upon rational expectations of future variables. Because
firms base their expectations of future variables in part on their observ~ions of the past, researchers
identified a link between lagged variables and current investment. Indeed, correlation of pmt output
growth and fiture “fidamentals” could be used to rationalize a strong correlation between current
investment and past values of the growth of output. When asked to explain the time-series
movements of investment, however, these new models proved
variables that were meant to capture the marginal cost or return to
very disappointing. Additiond
investment seemed to be of little
use, over and above output, in predicting investment. Moreover, structural parameter estimates
tended to be wildly implausible.
2 We update the time-series stylized facts in section III.
3 Eisner and Strotz (1963) offer an early discussion of adjustment costs. The theory was
developed and extended by Lucas (1967, 1976), Gould (1968), Treadway (1969, 1971), Uzawa
(1969), Mortensen (1973), Abel (1980), andHayashi(1982). Researchers have generally
assumed convex costs of adjusting the capital stock; the idea is that it is more costly to
implement a given increment to the capital stock quickly rather than gradually. We discuss
alternative assumptions about adjustment costs in Section V.It is at this point in the evolution of the literature that we begin this review. After briefly
reviewing neoclassical theory, we summarize recent theoretical advances in section II. Section 111
updates the time-series stylized facts for investment. In Section IV, we review recent empirical
studies of investment in producers’ durable equipment. After concluding in section IV that tax
policy designed to stimulate investment likely has done so, we turn in section V to the question of
the desirability of such intervention, highlighting the arguments that have been made for and against
stimulative tax policy. In section VI, we consider implications of our analysis for two current policy
questions--whether lower intlation offers a significant investment stimulus and the consequences for
investment of a switch from the current tax system to a broad-based consumption tax. Section VII
concludes.
II. Models of Investment in the Neoclassical Tradition
Models in the neoclassical tradition focus on the derived demand for capital by value-
maximizing firrns.4 This intuition is typically transformed into models of investment by making
assumptions about costs of changing the capital stock. For simplicity of exposition, consider the
decisions of a price-taking firm. Absent taxes, in each period t, firm i’s real net cash flow is given
by:
x = F(Ki,_, ,Nif)-w/N, {-p, li, -c(lif, K, (_,),
i,t (1)
where K(-) is the capital stock, ~(~) is the real revenue function of the firm, N is the variable factor,
w is the price of the variable factor, p is the real price of investment goods, and C~) is the function
4 For a more detailed discussion of the models introduced in this section, see Abel (1990).4
determining the cost of adjusting the capital stock. In the absence of taxes, then, the marginal cost
of newly installed capital is p, + Cl ~IioK,,,. J.
To study investment tax policy, we add to the net cash flow expression in(1) a profits tax
at rate ~, an investment tax credit at rate k, and the present value of a dollar’s worth of depreciation
allowances, Z.5 With these additions, the marginal cost of newly installed capital is:
p, (1 -ri ,) + (1 -T,) Cl (Ii , , Kit ,.,) ,
where ri, = k, + T, z,, , and we can rewrite (1) as:
xi, = (1 -T,) ( F(K, ,_,, N,) - w, Ni , - C1 (Zi ,, K.,,,.,))-P, (l -r, )],,. ,,
Under the assumption of value maximization, the firm maximizes the present value of its
fiture net cash flows. Letting ~ be the discount factor appropriate for the ith fin-n the firm’s value
at time t, firm value is given by:
(2)
where E,, is the expectations operator for firm i conditional on information available at time t. The
5 For the sake of simplifying the discussion, we focus hereon the U.S. tax system. For a
parallel analysis which employs a more general tax formulation which nests that of many
countries see Sinn (1987), and King and Fullerton (1984). Sweden, in particular, has had one of
the more complicated and interesting tax codes in the postwar period. For a discussion relating
their code to this model see Taylor (1982), Sodersten (1989), and Auerbach, Hassett, and
Sodersten (1995).<
J
firm chooses the path of investment and employment of the variable factor, given the initial capital
stock, to maximize firm value, The change in the capital stock — net investment — is given by lj, -
6K,,,.,, where 5 is the (assumed constant) proportional rate of depreciation.
For investment, the solution to the problem requires that the marginal value of an additional
unit of investment
investment by q:6
equal its marginal cost. Denoting the shadow value of an additional unit of
9,,, = P, (1 ‘ri, f) + (1 ‘T> CJ (l;, f , ‘i, f.~) ~ (3)
The shadow price q must also obey:
Aqi, = (r, + 6, q,, ~ - (I -~i) F~ (K,, ,.l , ~,, ~) + (1 -’c, ) .CK (Ii. , , Ki, /-1) ~ (4)
where r is the instantaneous rate at which marginal cash flows are discounted.
We can now use this general set up to examine two conventional formulations of the
neoclassical approach, one based on the user cost of capital and one based on q.
A. User Cost of Capital
Jorgenson (1963) and his collaborators suggested using a form of equation (4) to derive an
expression for the “user cost of capital. ” If we interpret q as the price at which a unit of capital can
be bought or sold, we can consider the thought experiment of renting a unit of newly installed
capital. The owner of this capital will levy a rental cost c such that the rate of return equals r, the
return available on alternative (financial) assets. me owner’s return from renting the capital equals
bImplicit in this derivation is the idea that firms can remove capital goods and sell them subject
to an adjustment cost.‘/
6
the rental cost, c, plus the capital gain on the machine, Aqi, ., /qi,, less the depreciation of the
machine, aq,,. Expressed as a rate of return and equating the rate of return with the available
alternative yields:
A q,
c;, =(l-tt)(r, +a)q, -—.
91,(
(5)
We can substitute for q in equation (3) to express the user cost as a function of the price of
investment goods, adjustment costs, and tax parameters. Jorgenson assumed that adjustment costs
were zero, yielding the fmiliar user cost expression:
I -ri, A 0,+1 (1-r,j )
cl.t ‘P, ( ~_’T )(rt+a _ p, (1 -r,,,)
), (6)
Returning to our derivation of q in (3), we can more generally express the user cost as equaling the
marginal cash flow of an additional unit of capital:
(1 ‘T, ) (FK(Kj,~., , ‘j, f) - c~ (1,, f , ‘i, ,-[)) = Cj,f .
Jorgenson’s interest centered on isolating the effects of the user cost on the desired capital
stock and investment, He considered a special case in which the prices p, w, and r are constant and
I,, = 5K,,,., in steady state, (so that C, = C~ = O). Hence from (7):
(1 -Tt) FK (Ki, ,.l , ~i,l) = c,,, .,./
7
Assuming a constant elasticity of substitution production fiction:
1
F(K, N)= A[bK-e+ (l-b) N-e ]-~,
where ~> O,0< b <1, and 6>-1, one can express the marginal revenue product of capital as:
FK(K,N)=(~ )(:)”8.
A“
Returning to the Jorgensonian derivation in (7), the steady-state capital stock can be described as a
function of the user cost of capital and the firm’s real revenue:
K* = (:)” F u (:)-” ,
A
(8)
where o is the elasticity of substitution (u = 1/(1 + (3)).
Equation (8) describes the steady-state capital stock, K*. As we describe in more detail
below, it is not an “estimating equation. ” To estimate investment, Jorgenson assumed that a = 1
(Cobb-Douglas technology), so that K*,,, = @/A~[() -r,)F, /c,, J. He then assumed that the capital
stock adjusted to the desired level at an exogenous rate dictated by, e.g., delivery lags. A substantial
empirical debate ensued, with Eisner and Nadiri (1968, 1970) claiming on the one hand that the
elasticity of substitution is nearer zero than unity, while Jorgenson and Stephenson (1969) claimed
on the other hand that an elasticity of unity is more consistent with the data.’
7 It maybe important to allow the ex an?e and expost values of u to be different, the
argument being that the labor needed for a given piece of capital in place is fixed. This is the
“putty-clay” hypothesis, put forward by Bischoff(1971 ). In some cases, these models have been
shown to perform well empirically (see Struckrneyer, 1977)..,/
8
More contemporary applications of the user cost model incorporate explicit adjustment costs
as opposed to ad hoc mechanism such as delivery lags. Auerbach (1989), for example, begins with
the Euler equation for investment and assumes a production function with productivity shocks and
adjustment cost function. He approximates the optimal solution for perturbations by solving a
linearized version of the Euler equation. He then derives a relationship between the investment rate
(1,,,/Kr,,.,) and the user cost of capital, in which the user cost coefficient is a finction of the steady-
state average user cost and a root of the linearized difference equation in K (for applications, see
Auerbach and Hassett, 1991, 1992; and Curnmins, Hassett, and Hubbard, 1994
B. The q Theory
Tobin’s (1969) q theory of investment made more rigorous Keynes’s (
1996).
936) idea that the
incentive to add new fixed capital depends on the market value of capital relative to its replacement
cost. Tobin represented by q the ratio of the market value of the firm to the replacement cost of its
capital stock. One can easily incorporate adjustment costs and tax parameters in the q fiarnework
(see Hayashi, 1982).
Returning to equation (2), we know that equilibrium marginal q is related to the price of
investment goods, tax parameters, and adjustment costs. If we assume that the adjustment cost
finction is quadratic:
C(I, , , K.,, ,,) = :(+- Pi )2 Kf, /.l,
r,f-l
(9)
where p is the steady-state rate of investment and u is the adjustrnent cost parameter, then equation
(2) can be rewritten as an investment equation:9
(lo)
Equation (1O)offers a convenient way of estimating the responsiveness of investment to neoclassical
variables, including tax parameters, but there is a hitch—marginal q is unobservable. Following
Hayashi (1982), if the firm is a price-taker in input and output markets, and the production function
exhibits constant returns to scale, marginal q equals average q, defined for each firm as tax-adjusted
q (denoted below by Q):
vi , +Bif -Ait
Q,,t= ‘ ‘ ‘!
KiR,_l
(11)
where V is the market value of the firm’s equity, B is the market value of the firm’s debt, A is the
present value of depreciation allowances on investment made before period t, and K~ is the
replacement value of the firm’s capital stock (including inventones).
The Q formulation stresses a relationship between investment and the net profitability of
investing, m measured by the difference be~een the value of an incremental unit of capital and the
tax-inclusive cost of purchasing capital. As with the user cost approach, by making assumptions
about costs of adjusting the capital stock, we can estimate effects of investment incentives on
investment,
C. Foreshadowing Empirical Problem
Jorgenson (1963) investigated whether a version of equation (8) could be used to describe
aggregate fluctuations in U.S. investment. Moving from this equilibrium relationship to an empirical10
model, however, required a few more steps. Because output is determined by the choice of K,
equation (8) does not relate K to a set of exogenous variables .6 Rather, it expresses a relationship
between endogenous variables that holds in equilibrium. Indeed, equation (8) does not define an
investment relationship, that is, theflow of capital, but rather describes only the equilibrium stock
of capital.9 Jorgenson moved to an “investment” specification by defting a firm’s “desired” capital
stock, K*as Y/c, and then assuming that the fm gradually approached this desired stock over time.
He assumed that the rate at which the fm closed the gap between its actual and desired stocks was
given exogenously, and did not effect the level of the “desired” stock. These assumptions yielded
the estimating equation:
(12)
Hall and Jorgenson (1967) originally used such a model to explain aggregate investment, and
concluded that it described the data well. Eisner and his collaborators later pointed out that the
model they estimated -- recognizing that ~ was the ratio of output to the user cost -- could be
capturing accelerator effects, which had long been known to be strong explanatory factors for
s To be more specific, Jorgenson assumed that the revenue function of the firm was Cobb-
Douglas and that the firm set marginal revenue (with respect to capital) equal to the user cost in
order to maximize profits.
9 For example, Haavelmo (1960) writes “The demand for investment cannot simply be
derived from the demand for capital.,.1 think the sooner this naive, and unfounded theory of the
demand for investment schedule is abandoned, the sooner we shall have a chance of making
some real progress in constructing more powerful theories to deal with the capricious short-run
variations in the rate of private investment. ” (quoted in Jorgenson, 1967, page 133)investment. In particular, if one constrained the user cost to be a constant, one could rewrite (12) as:
(13)
which is a form of an accelerator model. When critics of Hall and Jorgenson isolated the separate
contribution of the user cost to explaining investment, they found it to be negligible- (see Eisner,
1969, 1970; Eisner and Nadiri, 1968; and Chirinko and Eisner, 1983).
Nonetheless, by the late 1960s, the neoclassical model developed by Jorgenson and others
had become the standard model for studying investment decisions, but empirical debates remained.
On the one hand, the neoclassical approach offers a structural link be,~een tax policy parameters
— the corporate tax rate, the present value of depreciation allowances, and the investment tax credit
— and investment through the user cost of capital. 10 On the
suggested that the more rigorous theory did not improve the
other hand, the empirical evidence
econometrician’s ability to explain
aggregate investment fluctuations or the response of business investment to changes in tax policy.
Partially in response to this empirical concern, models based on the Q representation of the
firm’s investment problem occupied much of the empirical research by the 1980s.11 A key appeal
of the Q approach was that it related investment to a variable that was (under certain assumptions)
easier to observe than the user cost of capital. However, early emptical adaptation of Q models did
‘0In an alternative representation, Feldstein (1982) explored the effects of effective tax rates
on investment in reduced-form models; for a critique of this approach, see Chirinko (1987).
11As we noted earlier, Hayashi (1982) provided the conditions required to equate marginal q
with average Q, which is observable because it depends on the market valuation of the firm’s assets.
Summers (198 1) incorporated additional tax parameters in the Q model.‘.?
12
not fare well in explaining either time-series or cross-sectional (firm-level) variation in investment.
Despite such empirical titrations, policymakers in the United States and other industrial
economies evidently believe that business fixed investment responds to tax changes — given the
frequency with which they manipulate tax policy parameters. Hence it is disturbing that models
emphasizing the net return to investing are defeated in forecasting “horse races” by ad hoc models
and that structural variables are frequently found to be economically or statistically insignificant. 12
Recently, the investment literature has begun to make a convincing case that the fundamentals are
in fact key determinants of investment, but that they appeti to have little effect in the macro data
because of several severe econometric problems, 13 TO set the stage for the discussion of these
problems in Section IV, we first review key “stylized facts” about the time-series behavior of
business fixed investment and “fundamental determinants of investment.”
III. Some Stylized Facts about Business Fixed Investment
In Figure 1, we plot aggregate U.S. equipment investment against several investment
“fidamentals.” The top panel shows the comovement of investment and the Jorgensonian user cost.
The series rarely move together in an obvious way, and the correlation since 1960 is a statistically
insignificant -0.11. The second panel illustrates the strong comovements between investment and
corporate cash flow. The two series are rou@y coincident, and the correlation over time is a highly
‘2See, e.g., Bosworth (1985), Bemde, Bohn, and Reiss (1988), and the survey in Chirinko
(1993). The often poor empirical performance of Q models has led some researchers to abandon the
assumptions of reversible investment and convex costs used in testing neoclassical models in favor
of approaches based on lumpy and “irreversible” investment. See, e.g., the discussions and reviews
of studies inPindyck(1991 ), Dixit and Pindyck (1994), and Hubbard (1994).
13Taylor (1993) does find, however, that aggregate fixed investment is significantly
negatively related to the real interest rate in every one of the G7 countries.13
significant 0.64. The bottom panel illustrates the “accelerator” effect, which relates changes in the
growth rates of output and equipment spending. As with cash flow, the
highly significant, and the coincidence of the series is visually striking.
correlation is large and
While one should be cautious interpreting such correlations formally, they nonetheless
suggest clear patterns. Aggregate equipment investment varies significantly over the business cycle,
and neither lags or leads the cycle; it is highly correlated with other variables that are also highly
procyclical. The time-series correlation between investment and the user cost, on the other hand,
is quite weak. Figure 1 can be thought of as a visual summary of the early investment literature:
Accelerator effects are strong and obvious; user cost effects appear weaker and more subtle,
We focus on studies of equipment investment, in large part bqcause empirical attempts to
model investment in structures have been more disappointing. Figure 2, which repeats Figure 1
with the relevant “fundamentals” related to the growth rate of investment in nonresidential structures,
illustrates the problem. Structures investment is less clearly correlated with all of the
“fundamentals.” The correlation with the user cost is insignificant and has the incorrect sign, the
correlation with cash flow is about one-fourth of that between cash flow and equipment investment,
and the accelerator effect, while still noticeable, is significantly weaker.
An alternative branch of the investment literature has followed the suggestion of To bin
(1969) that investment should be related to Q, the ratio of the market value of the firm to the
replacement costs of its capital stock. Figure 3 depicts the correlation of aggregate business fixed
investment with Q. 14The top panel compares the level of real investment to the level of Q. Clearly,
14The measure of Q plotted here is constructed from data from the Federal Reserve’s Flow of
Funds Accounts..,,
14
the low frequency movements in the two series are not highly correlated. The bottom panel relates
the growth rates of these two series. Here it appears that growth in Q leads growth in investment
somewhat, although the relationship is weak, and the contemporaneous correlation is actually
negative. 15
To summarize, the tendency for a number of aggregate variables to move together over the
business cycle makes it difficult to isolate effects of individual tidamentals on investment, Hence
a partial equilibrium investment demand approach might have very little power to explain aggregate
investment fluctuations. Movements of the aggregate variables -- including investment -- are
determined simultaneously, and disentangling the marginal impact of a single driving variable is
difficult if not impossible. For example, suppose that aggregate dem~d increases exogenously for
some reason. This shift might lead firms to be more optimistic about their sales prospects and to
purchme more investment goods; it might also be expected -- at least in the short run --to lead to
higher interest rates. If we then examine the correlation between investment and the interest rate,
we might even find that the sign is the opposite of that predicted by the theory. While an
instrumental variables procedure might allow us to overcome this simultaneity problem, the
estimator is only as good as the instruments, and it is difficult to imagine an appropriate set of
instruments for this application. Macroeconomic dam however, provide a rich additional source of
15 If we regress the growth rate of business fixed investment on many lags of the growth rate
of Q, the sum of the coefficients is about 0.1, implying that a 20 percent increase in the growth
rate of Q would lead to a prediction of about a 2 percent higher growth rate of business fixed
investment. Cochrane (1992) finds significant] y larger effects of the growth of Q on the growth
of total private investment. The results differ because Cochrane’s measure of investment includes
residential investment, which is -- perhaps surprisingly -- more highly comelated with stock
market fluctuations.15
variation, and it is to the microdata studies that we now turn.
IV. Estimating Effects of Tax Policy on Investment Using Micro Data
Standard investment models emphasizing the net return to investment yield four empirical
representations. Each begins with the firm maximizing its net present value. The first-order
conditions lead to an Euler equation describing the period-to-period optimal path of investment.
Abel and Blanchard (1986) solved the difference equation that relates investment to its expected
current and future marginal revenue products of capital; Gilchrist and Hirnrnelberg (1994) apply a
related forecasting approach to panel data. Alternatively, effects of tax parameters may be estimated
from the Euler equation (see, e.g., Abel, 1980; and Hubb~d and Kashyap, 1992). As in Auerbach
(1983b) and Abel (1990), investment can be expressed in terms of c~ent and future values of the
user cost of capital and, under some conditions, expressed in terms of average q. Again, this
approach was suggested initially by Tobin (1969), with the necessary conditions supplied by Hayashi
(1982).
A. The Bmic Problem
To assess recent empirical work on tax policy and investment, we begin with the following





where 1 and K denote investment and the capital stock, respectively; S is an underlying structural
variable (e.g., the expected value of tax-adjusted Q or the user cost of capital) or set of variables; y
is a coefficient whose structural interpretation relates to assumptions about convex costs of adjusting16
the capital stock; and ~ is a white-noise error term that reflects optimization error by firms. 16
Researchers usually estimated such models using either ordinary least squares or generalized
method of moments techniques with instrumental variables. Curnmins, Hmsett, and Hubbard (1994,
1996) note that conventional estimated values of y in firm-level panel data for the United States or
for other countries are very small, ranging from 0,01 to 0.05, implying marginal costs of adjustment
of between one and five dollars per dollar of investment. Such estimates, which hav~ emerged in
many empirical studies (see, e.g., Summers, 198 1; Salinger and Summers, 1983; and Fazzari,
Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988a), imply very small effects of permanent investment incentives on
investment.
Subsequently, empirical researchers have offered two general ~xplanations of the ftilure to
estimate significant tax effects on investment — (1) measurement error in fundamental variables,
and (2) misspecification of costs of adjusting the capital stock. Both research programs have
contributed to our understanding of the responsiveness of investment to changes in the net return to
investing and have reached similar conclusions about the likely effects of tax policy for some
important cases.
B. Mewurement Error in Fundamental Variables
A major problem in using equation(14) in order to recover estimates of marginal adjustment
costs and the effect of tax changes on investment is that measurement error in Q or the user cost of
capital may bias downward the estimated coefficient. A number of techniques have been suggested
to address this measurement error, including: (1) statistical corrections, (2) avoiding the use of Q
16One could, of course, incorporate more complex error structures. We m~e this simplifying
assumption for ease of exposition.or user cost representations, (3) using new proxies for Q, (4) focusing on periods or frequencies in
which firm variation in fundamental variables is less subject to measurement error, and (5)
modifiing assumptions about the financial frictions fires face. We consider each in turn below and
examine whether the techniques produce a “consensus” estimate of adjustment costs that can be used
to forecast the effects of investment incentives on business fixed investment.
Statistical Approaches. There are at least two problems in measuring Q that might affect
estimated adjustment costs. First, to the extent that the stock market is excessively volatile, Q might
not reflect market fundamentals. Second, the replacement value of the capital stock in the
denominator of Q is likely to be measured with error. Gnliches and Hausman (1986) argue that
measurement error will lead to different biases among potential estimators that are similar in that
they control for firm-specific effits, but differ in their signal-to-noise ratios, making it possible to
place bounds on the importance of measurement error. Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard (1994)
estimate a model like (14) using first differences and longer differences (as opposed
conventional fixed-effects, within-group estimator) to address measurement error problems.
estimated adjustment costs decline significantly.




on a suggestion by Stock and Watson (1993). Caballero argues that small sample biases of typically
employed time-series estimation procedures are partictiarly severe when estimating adjustment cost
models, and he shows that elasticities will generally be biased down. Using the procedure of Stock
and Watson for estimating the low-frequency relationships between variables in small samples,
Caballero estimates a long-run elasticity of investment with respect to the user cost of approximately
unity. This is much larger than the early estimate, but roughly consistent with the other studies18
summarized in this section.
Euler Equation Estimates, The second approach departs from the strategy of using proxies
for marginal q, and relies on the firm’s Euler equation to model the investment decision. (As long
as one makes the same assumption about technology and adjustment costs, the Euler equation can
be derived from the same model as the conventional Q or user cost of capital models.) By not
relying on the “investment tiction” representation, one can sidestep problems of measuring
marginal q.
Tests following this approach have frequently used panel data on manufacturing firms to
estimate the Euler equation (Pindyck and Rotemberg, 1983; Shapiro, 1986; Gilchrist, 1991; Whited,
1992; Bond and Meghir, 1994; and Hubbard, Kashyap, and Whited, 1995). Studies using Compustat
data for the United States are unable to reject the fiictionless neoclassical model for most firms, and
the estimated adjustment cost parameters are more reasonable than those found in estimates of Q
models. For example, Hubbard, Kashyap, and Whited (1995) report estimated values of y between
1 and 2.2. Very similar estimates are reported for European manufacturing firms by Cummins,
Harris, and Hassett (1995) and for investment in overseas subsidiaries of U.S. multinational
corporations in Cumrnins and Hubbard (1995).
Alternatives to Q. The measure of average Q used as a proxy for marginal q in most
empirical studies is constructed as the ratio of the market value of the financial claims on the firm
(equity and debt) to the replacement cost of the firm’s capital stock. The third approach bypasses
using financial variables as proxies for marginal q by forecasting the expected present value of the
current and fiture profits generated by an incremental unit of capital — that is, the expected value
of marginal q — an idea developed (in the time-series context) by Abel and Blanchard (1986) and19
extended for use in panel data by Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995).
a panel-data setting by constructing investment fundamentals using a
One can extend this setup to
VAR forecasting framework
to decompose the effect of profits or cash flow on investment into two components — one that
forecasts fiture profitability under the fiictiordess capital markets assumed in the neoclassical model
(analogous to marginal q) and a residual component that maybe attributable to financial frictions
(analogous to the role played by cash flow in the imperfect-capital-markets approach of F~i,
Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988a). By including lags of cash flow in the vector of observed
fidamentals in the forecasting equations, one cm ensure that any information about fiture marginal
profitability of capital contained in cash flow is reflected in the proxy for marginal q.
Using such an approach, Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) report estimates of y that are
roughly consistent with the Eder equation estimates discussed above. In addition, they test whether
cash flow is an independent “fundamental” variable explaining investment and find that it is for a
subset of firms that are likely to face liquidity constraints. 17 We return to a discussion of this latter
result below.
Measuring Changes in Fun&mentals Using Tm Reforms. As we discussed in the previous
section, one reason the data do not appear to favor neoclassical models over accelerator models is
a simultaneous equations problem: If, on the one hand, the data were dominated by exogenous
increases or decreases in the real interest rate, then the user cost movements would lead investment
‘7This is a test of the restricted model against the alternative model that current profits have
explanatory power for investment beyond their ability to predict future profits. Gilchrist and
Himmelberg find that cash flow is an independent fidamental and that excess sensitivity of
investment to cash flow is a characteristic of fms they identifi as constrained — measured by size,
bond rating, commercial paper rating, or dividend payout.20
to decrease or increase, respectively. If, on the other hand, investment rises with positive “animal
spirits,” then higher investment demand puts upward pressure on the real interest rate. Hence to the
extent that data incorporate both exogenous changes in the real interest rate and in the intercept of
the investment finction, the positive relationship between investment and the user cost of capital
because of shifis in the investment function may dominate the hypothesized negative relationship
between investment and the user cost of capital. In this case, the estimated coefficient on the user
cost of capiti will be “too small,” leading to estimated adjustment costs that are “too large. ” Such
simultaneity increases apparent accelerator effects, because positive shifts of the investment function
raise both investment and output.
As we noted above, this simultaneity problem in the estimation of neoclassical models is
remedied by the use of instrumental variables, Conventional instrumental variables (including
lagged endogenous variables or sales-to-capital ratios) have not proven very helpful. Major tax
reforms arguably offer periods in which there is exogenous cross-seclional variation in the user cost
of capital or tax-adjusted q. Cumrnins, Hassett, and Hubbard (1994, 1996) demonstrate that major
tax reforms are also msociated with significant h- and asset-level variation in key tax parameters
(such as the effective rate of investment tax credit and the present value of depreciation allowances).
Hence tax variables are likely to be a good instrument for the user cost or Q during tax reforms.
To indicate the significance of cross-sectional heterogeneity in incentives to invest, we
emphasize variation across assets. Figure 5 plots the annual values of (1 - r ) for the 22 classes of
equipment capital classified by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The peaks and valleys along the
“year” axis for a given asset reveal the time-series variation in the tax parameters, and those along
the “asset” axis for a given year reveal the cross-sectional variation. For asset eight (metalworking,.
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machinery), for example, the tier-tax cost of investing falls in 1962, 1972, and 1981, and rises in
1986,
Figure 5 reveals that the variation across assets is large within most years in our samples, as
is the time-series variation. In addition, the positions of the peaks and valleys changes somewhat
over time. For example, following the removal of the investment tax credit and the reduction of the
corporate tax rate by the Tax Refom Act of 1986, the cross-sectional variation across assets fell,
consistent with the act’s stated goal to “level the playing field.”
Curnmins, Hassett, and Hubbard (1995) use vector autoregressions to forecast investment
in the year following a tax reform, and then compare the forecast errors for each of the assets to the
changes in the user cost for that asset. In Figure 6, we repeat that expe~ent and for the Tax Refom
Act of 1986, and provide a plot of the forecast errors constructed from models that exclude taxes
against shocks to the user cost of capital for each of the 22 equipment asset classes tracked by the
BEA. In addition, we draw a regression line through the scatterplot. The idea is that the forecast
errors for investment shodd be negatively correlated with forecast errors for the user cost of capital.
The downward-sloping line indicates a clear negative correlation.
We can now illustrate the effect of tax parameters on firm investment. Table 1 shows the
significance of using exogenous tax changes to identifi changes in Q.la Taken from Cummins,
Hmsett, and Hubbard (1996), it presents estimates of the investment equation(14) during major tax
reforms in 14 countries over the 1980s; firm-level data are taken from Compustat’s Global Vantage.
Using contemporaneous tax variables as instrument during major tax reforms, Cummins, Hassett,
1aCummins, Hassett, md Hubbard (1994, 1995) also use this approach in a user cost model.
For U.S. dat~ they estimate a user cost coefficient of about -0.65.../
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and Hubbard estimate y to be 0.65 for the United States, compared with 0,048 under conventional
estimates. The y obtained similar estimates for each of the other major U.S. tax reforms in the
postwar period using data from Compustat (Curnmins, Hassett, and Hubbard, 1994); focusing on the
T= Reform Act of 1986, Auerbach andHassett(1991 ) found similar coefficients using asset level
data and cross-sectional variation in the user cost. As Table 1 shows, applying the Curnmins-
Hassett-Hubbard approach in tax reform periods in other OECD countries produces estimates
roughly similar to those for the United States. 19
Financial Frictions and the Neoclassical Model. In contrast to the frictionless capital
markets in the standard neoclassical model, earlier applied research on investment, especially the
work of Meyer and Kuh (1957), stressed the significance of financiaL considerations (particularly
I
internal fids or net worth) for business investment. Since the mid-l 960s, however, most applied
research on investment isolated “real” fm decisions from “fmcing.” The intellectual justification
for this shift in approach drew on the seminal work by Modigliani and Miller (1958), who
demonstrated the irrelevance of fmcial structure and financial policy for real investment decisions
‘9Tax reforms are not the only plausible reform that can be used to estimate adjustment costs.
There is a large body of evidence suggesting that union power to expropriate returns is
significant, and that the “union tax” adjusts as the return to capital changes. If union wage
demands vary with the return to capital, then the union rent share is--in part at least--a tax on
capital, distorting the level of investment when it is introduced. Fallick andHassett(1995)
explore whether a change in the union status of the fim is another type of large identifiable
shock that affects purchases of capital. Using firm-level panel data, they document a large
negative response of investment to union certification elections. For most of the firms who
experience union certification elections in their sample, net investment turns significantly
negative in the year immediately following the election, with the mean response to union
certification being roughly the same size as that which would occur -- given the responsiveness
of investment to the user cost in Cumrnins, Hassett, and Hubbard (1994) -- if the corporate tax
rate were increased 35 percentage points. This set of firms, at least, is not burdened by an ability
to adjust their capital stock downward when a negative shock to profitability occurs....
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under certain conditions. The central Modigliani-Miller result, which facilitated the early
development of the neoclassical model, was that a firm’s financial structure will not affect its value
in frictionless capital markets. As a result, if their assumptions are satisfied, real firm decisions,
motivated by the maximization of shareholders’ claims, are independent of financial factors such as
the availability of internal tids.
The assumption of representative fms (in terms of trade on capital markets) is common to
most research programs in the neoclassical tradition. That is, the same empirical model (e.g.,
equation (14)) applies to all firms. Therefore, tests could not ascertain whether the observed
sensitivity of investment to financial variables differs across firms and whether these differences in
sensitivity explain the weak apparent relationship between the meas~d user cost and investment.
Contemporary empirical studies of information and incentive problems in the investment process
have moved beyond the assumption of representative fires by examining firm-level panel data in
which firms can be grouped into “high net worth” and “low net worth” categories. For the latter
category, changes in net worth or internal fids tiect investment, holding constant underlying
investment opportunities (desired investment) .20Following Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988a),
empirical researchers have
“financially unconstrained.”
placed firms into groups as a priori “financially constrained” or
Two aspects of the findings of this research program are noteworthy in the context of
measuring incentives to invest. First, numerous empirical studies have found that proxies for
internal funds have explanatory power for investment, holding constant Q, the user cost, or
20For reviews of the theoretical literature, see Bemanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996); Hubbard
(1990); and Hubbad (1996).accelerator variables (see the review of studies in Hubbard, 1995). This suggests that tax policy may
have effects on investment by constrained firms beyond those predicted by neoclassical approaches.
(Indeed, returning to the “accelerator” analogy, Bemanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) argue that
this literature describes a “financial accelerator.”) In particular, the quantity of internal finds
available for investment is supported by the average tax on earnings from existing projects. In this
sense, average as well as marginal tax rates faced by a firm affect its investment decisions.21
Second, empirical studies of financing constraints generally find that the fiictionless
neoclassical model is rejected ordy for the groups of firms that a priori are financially constrained
(see, e.g., Calomiris and Hubbard, 1995; Gilchrist and Himelberg, 1995; and Hubbard, Kashyap,
and, Whited, 1995). Hence while the shadow value of internal funds may not be well captured for
some firms in standard representations of the neoclassical approach, the neoclassical model with
convex adjustment costs yields reasonable estimated values of marginal adjustment costs for most
firms.
Measurement Error and A~ustment Costs: Nearing Consensus? To summarize, a variety
21Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen(1988b) and Gertler and Hubbard(1988b) illustrate this point
in examining the affect of the investment tax credit on investment. Calomiris and Hubbard (1995)
focus on a tax experiment in which retained earnings are taxed more heavily than distributed profits.
In frictionless capital markets, firms would take advantage of the incentive to change their payout
policies. Working against this response for some firms is the potential difference in the cost of
internal and external fids. To the extent that the marginal cost of external tids is high, a growing
firm with profitable investment opporhmities might choose to pay the undistributed profits tax and
invest its internal finds, rather than distribute tids and then reacquire them in the capital market.
me U.S. Undistributed Profits Tax of 1936-1937, which imposed a graduated surtax on corporate
retention offers a usefil experiment. Because the maximum marginal tax rate on corporate retention
was 27 percent, most firms had large incentives to alter their payout policies. Using firm-level panel
data from the 1930s, Calomiris and Hubbard find that a neoclassical investment model with no
explicit capital-market frictions is rejected ordy for firms with high ex anfe surtax margins.25
of empirical implementations of the neoclassical model with convex adjustment costs have attempted
to mitigate measurement error and other econometric problems in conventional OLS and GMM
estimates of equation (14) in panel data. The methods described above generally yield estimated
values of y of 0.50 or higher, implying marginal costs of adjustment in the range of $0.10 per dollar
of additional investment (using the estimate in Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard, 1995 as a
benchmark), and elasticities of investment with respect to the user cost of capital between -0.5 and
-1.0.
C. An Alternative Interpretation: Misspect~~ation of Adjustment Cos&
The emphasis in many recent empirical studies of investment on sources of mismeasurement
of explanatory variable acting as proxies for the net return to investing accepts the conventional
belief that costs of adjusting the capital stock are convex. The Q, user cost of capital, and Euler
equation approaches can all be derived from the same intertemporal ma.ximi=tion problem, given
common assumptions about technology, competition, and adjustment costs. An important recent
line of inquiry focuses on modeling and testing the effects of irreversibility and uncertainty on firms’
investment decisions (see, e.g., the excellent survey by Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). 22 If this literature
is correct, then there may be important regions wherein tax policy has little or no effect on
investment, and knowledge of which region an economy is currently in is an important prerequisite
to any policy analysis, Finally, these models can possibly explain a key remaining pwle in the
22 The seeds of this literature are much older. For example, Rothschild(1971) writes:
“’’Convex cost-of-adjustment fictions may help to explain why Rome was not built in a day.
However, there is no clear saving and maybe some loss to spreading the work of installing a
button on a shirt over several weeks.” His “bang-bang” model of investment provides an early
example of a “lumpy investment” model..,,.
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literature -- that is, why firms report in surveys that they use such high hurdle rates (see Summers,
1987).
Neoclassical models implicitly assume that there is an efficient secondary market for capital;
hence irreversibility poses no problem. If a firm purchases a machine today, and the output market
turns sour in the future, the firm can recoup the purchase price of the machine at that time. If,
however, investment is irreversible, then the firm faces the chance that it cannot sell the machine in
the future. In this setup, there is a gain to delaying investment and allowing the random price
process to move either into a region far enough above the neoclassical “breakeven” point that the
probability of the “bad state” becomes low enough, or into a region where it clearly does not make
sense to purchase the machine. An investment extinguishes the value qf the call option of delay, an
option that has positive value when prices are uncertain. In this approach, the value of the lost
option is a component of the opportunity cost of investment. In the tetiology of the Q framework,
the threshold criterion for investment requires that marginal Q exceed unity by the value of
maintaining the call option to invest. As a consequence, high “hurdle rates” may be required by
corporate managers making investment decisions.
Indeed, at least part of the interest in option-based investment models has been the problem
raised in many time-series studies that indicated that the response of investment to changes in Q or
the user cost of capital are implausibly small, implying, perhaps, that there are regions wherein Q
varies but investment does not. In addition, it is not difficult to suggest examples of nonconvex
adjustment costs—such as retooling in automobile plants or the adoption of more energy-efficient
kilns in cement plants.
How Much Investmen/ ISIrreversible? Before turning to models with alternative adjustment‘.?
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cost specifications, we present in this subsection aprimafacie case that pure irreversibility may not
be of overriding importance at the aggregate level.
There is a large literature (see, e.g., Hulten and Wykoff, 979; Jorgenson, 1994; Fraumeni,
1995; and Oliner, 1996) that focmes on the estimation of economic depreciation rates for different
types of machines. For the most part, researchers estimate rates of decay from the patterns of used
machine prices. This literature is relevant to the debate concerning the form of adjustment costs
because irreversibility results most plausibly from either the absence of resale markets, or from the
presence of significant “lemons” problems in resale markets.
To examine the extent to which resale markets are limited, we surveyed the depreciation
literature and cataloged types of equipment for which we could find an estimated economic
depreciation rate. Using disaggregated data on investment by asset type, we than calculated the
proportion of aggregate investment that is made up of assets that have clearly identifiable resale
markets. Figure 4 plots this proportion from 1950 to 1994. The proportion of investment in assets
that have easily identifiable resale markets is about 0.7 over most of the period. This is not to say
that the remaining assets are necessarily “irreversible,” of course; depreciation studies may not yet
have fomd data for those assets.
Hence in order to demonstrate that irreversibility is an important property of most investment
goods, researchers must show that the market for used capital goods is plagued with lemons
problems. To our knowledge, there is no existing evidence that lemons are important in markets for
equipment goods. Indeed, Hulten and Wykoff(1981 ) argue that estimated secondary market prices
in depreciation studies are inconsistent with a major role for lemons problems. One reason for this
finding may be that the market for used capital goods is one where the participants possesssignificant asset-specific expertise. The typical purchaser of a machine tool, for example, may have
worked in a factory filled with machine tools for many years, and would easily recognize a “lemon.”
If this is the case, there is little asymmetric information, and the resale market functions well.
Models with More General A@ustmenl Costs. Abel and Eberly (1994) provide a general
framework that encompasses reversibility, fixed costs, and a wide array of alternative adjustment
cost specidcations. They show that, under certain conditions, the investment behavior of firms can
be characterized by three distinct regimes: (1) regime in which gross investment is positive; (2)
regime in which gross investment is zero; (3) regime in which gross investment is negative. The
responsiveness of investment to tidarnentals differs across regimes, and their more general model
predicts that there is a region in which gross investment will stay zero for a range of unfavorable
values of Q. Because this model nests the more traditional q models, it provides a usefil empirical
framework, and we review attempts to estimate this model below.
Researchers are begiting to study the impact of alternative adjustment cost assumptions
within structural investment models with panel data. Barnett and Sakellaris (1995) use Compustat
data to investigate the implication of the model of Abel andEberly(1995) that investment alternates
between regimes of insensitivity to Q and regimes of responsiveness to Q. The region of inactivity
should be close to the region for which the model predicts that investment is negative. Because the
thresholds for these regions are unknown, conventional asymptotic distributions do not apply.
Barnett and Sakellaris use a statistical framework that allows them to estimate the threshold points
and the coefficients on Q simultaneously in the different regions given the threshold points. They
find evidence of a nonlinear relationship between investment and Q; in particular, they estimate the
largest responsiveness of investment to Q for low values of Q, and the smallest for very high values...
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of Q. On average, they estimate that the elasticity of investment with respect to Q is about unity,
but that the aggregate elasticity varies considerably over time, depending on the average level of Q.
Barnett and Sakellaris argue that their results imply that adjustment cost may not be quadratic, but
that the most likely cause is not firms’ inability to disinvest, but rather, their reluctance to make
“large” changes.
Barnett and Sakellaris’s results we not necessarily inconsistent with the measurement error
story. Some firms in their Compustat universe have values of average Q that are astronomical (one
firm actually has a q of 40,000!), presumably because the capital stock measure is missing important
goodwill or human capital components, If one accepts that Q is a poor measure of fidamentals for
these firms, then the result that investment does not respond as much to Q for these firms is not
surprising. In the more “normal” range of Q values, the investment response seems to accord well
with the predictions of the convex adjustment cost model.
Finally, Caballero, Engel, and Haltiwanger (1995) explore adjustment costs in a more general
framework. Using a subset of 7000 U.S. manufacturing plants from the Census Bureau’s
Longitudinal Research Database (LRD), they explore whether cross-sectional patterns of investment
are consistent with symmetric, convex adjustment cost models, or whether the data imply that there
are nonconvexities ,23 They proceed in two steps. First, they assume that there are no adjustment
costs and that the Jorgensonian model adequately describes a firms “desired” capital stock (~). 24
23 In earlier work, Doms and Dunne (1994) report that plant-level investment data exhibit
skewness and kurtosis that is consistent with investment being somewhat “lumpy.”
24 To calculate the desired capital stock for each firm, Caballero, Engel, and Haltiwanger use
plant-level output data, and two-digit Jorgensonian user costs constructed from the tax data used
in Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard (1994) and Goolsbee (1995).‘r<
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They then compare in each period a firm’s beginning-of-period capital stock to its desired stock and
call the difference (~-K,., ) “mandated investment. ” Second, they explore how firms actually adjust
their capital stocks. In this step, they find that the relationship between actual and mandated
investment is highly nonlinear. If mandated investment is negative, then firms do not quickly adjust
their capital stocks downward, If mandated investment is small and positive, then firms also do not
respond very much. If mandated investment is very large, then fms adjust their capiti stocks very
quickly. They conclude that an (S, s) model, in which furns have a range of inaction, and ordy adjust
their capital stocks to their desired levels when the gap between current and desired capital stock is
“large enough” offers a good description of the data.
Using firm-level data from Compustat, Abel andEberly(1996) estimate that the relationship
between investment and fundamental determinants (Q and the tax-adjusted price of capital goods)
is concave; that is, the response of investment to fi.lndamental determinants is positive, but
monotonically declining. The results of Abel and Eberly suggest that the distribution of tax-adjusted
Q or the user cost of capital maybe a determinant of aggregate investment. However, the caution
that applied to Barnett and Sakellaris conclusions applies here as well: Large observed values of Q
may not coincide with high levels of inves~ent because the high Q values reflect rnismeasuremen4
rather than extraordinary fidarnentals.
Caballero, Engel, and Haltiwanger also illustrate how to construct aggregate implications
from their microeconornic results. Integrating over the macroeconomic distribution of plants, they
calculate a predicted aggregate elasticity of investment with respect to the user cost of capital. The
estimates of this elasticity vary considerably over time: If, on the one hand, many plants are near
the region for which mandated investment is very large, then small changes in the user cost can have.,,.
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large effects on aggregate investment. If, on the other hand, the bulk of the distribution of mandated
investment is in the region of low responsiveness of investment to fundamentals, then changes in
the user cost will have little impact. They concur with the main conclusion of Cummins, Hassett,
and Hubbard (1994) that the aggregate elasticity of investment with respect to the user cost is
between -0.5 and -1, and also conclude that tax reforms appear to have generally had large effects
on investment. They caution, however, that the reforms have had large effects because they
coincidentally occurred during periods in which the plant-level distribution of mandated investment
was aligned in such a way to allow a large effect of changes in tax parameters. This would happen
if, for example, investment tax credits were removed in booms, when mandated investment is very
large, and an increase in the user cost can cause firms to canceI significant investment plans. As a
consequence, Caballero, Engel, and Haltiwanger argue that researchers must consult the micro
distribution of mandated investment before predicting the likely impact of future tax reforms on
business investment.25
Alternatively, Curnmins, Hassett, and Hubbard (1994, 1996) argue that recovering
“reasonable” estimates of the response of investment to Q or the user cost of capital is easiest during
periods in which large exogenous changes in the distribution of structural determinants occur, as
during tax reforms. In response to the alternative interpretation that firms respond only to changes
in fidamentals when these changes are large, Curnmins, Hassett, and Hubbard use firm-level data
25 Because their mandated investment measure is the same as that in a frictionless
neoclassical model, their tests -- while suggestive -- neither confirm or reject the presence of
convex adjustment costs. First, mandated investment itself depends on adjustment costs.
Second, if adjustment costs were present, mandated investment also depends on fiture values of
tax parameters.,/
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to investigate whether there was evidence of “bunching” of investment around tax reforms. They
estimate transition probabilities among various ranges of (l/K) over the year prior to, of, and after
the tax reform, and find no evidence that firms with large investment were likely to have lower
investment in prior or subsequent years. Indeed, only a very tiny fraction of the sample was ever
found to transit from high investment to low investment states.
In part, the conclusions of these studies may differ because of differences in the level of
aggregation. At a sufficiently fme level of disaggregation, all investment looks lumpy. The plant-
level evidence suggests that investment appears lumpy, but the firm-level evidence does not
corroborate this. However, there may be interesting differences between the
of plants and firms, as might be the case if, for example, managerial auention
investment behavior
is limited and only a
fraction of a firm’s plants adjust their capital in a given year. Clearly, reconciling the plant-level and
firm-level results is an important topic for future research.
D. Summing Up: The Partial Equilibrium Eflects of Investment Tax Policy
Recent studies appear to have reached a consensus that the elasticity of investment with
respect to the user cost of capital is between -0.5 and -1.0. Indeed, recent studies using convex costs
of adj ustment and studies using nonconvex costs of adjustments agree that the long-run elasticity
of investment to the user cost is high by the standards of the early empirical literature. This range
of estimated responses of investment to tax parameters is well above the consensus of only a few
years ago, and suggests that investment tax policy can have a significant impact on the path of
aggregate capital formation. One should be cautious, however, in moving from the macroeconomic
evidence to aggregate predictions. Caballero, Engel, and Haltiwanger demonstrate a technique for
aggregating the micro distribution of fms to calculate aggregate investment demand, but very little33
continues to be known about the general equilibrium effects of major policy changes.
v. Arguments For and Against Investment Incentives
Thus far we have argued that: (1) tax incentives for investment are important components
of the net return to investing, and (2) the short-term and long-term responses of investment to
pemanent tax incentives are large. We now turn to the deeper policy question of whether we should
have permanent incentives for investment even if such incentives increase the stock of business fixed
capital. (We then address the question of the desirability of short-run incentives.) Economists
generally argue against intervention. Under what circumstances might one advocate distortionary
investment incentives?
A. Do Investment Incentives Affect the Price of Capital Goods?
One scenario under which investment incentives might have an especially large impact on
the quantity of investment without dissipation in prices of investment goods is one in which firms’
demand for capital is responsive to changes in the user cost of capital and in which capital goods are
supplied perfectly elastically. While it is implausible that the supply function for most individual
capital goods manufacturers is perfectly elastic, the effective supply of capital goods to a given
domestic market might well be highly elastic in the long run if the world market for capital goods
is open. Investment incentives would raise prices of capital goods in the short run if the supply of
capital goods is highly inelastic.
Using data for the United States and ten other countries, Hassett and Hubbard (1995) find
that local investment tax credits have a negligible effect on prices paid for capital goods, indeed, they
find that the capital goods prices for most countries are very highly correlated, and that the
movements of these over time are consistent with “the law of one price.” In addition, using34
disaggregated data on reset-specific investment good prices and tax variables for the United States,
they find that tax parameters have no effect on capital goods prices. ‘b The conclusion that tax policy
in the United States does not affect the world price of capital goods is especially meaningful, given
the relative size of the U.S. economy. Taken together, these tests suggest that the effects of
investment tax policy have not been muted in a significant way by upward-sloping supply schedules
for capital goods.
B. Is the Capital Stock Too Small?
While it is instructive to ask how effective investment incentives are at increasing the fixed
capital stock, a more important question remains: What is the social value of the increase in the
fixed capital stock?
Theoretical research has demonstrated that perfectly competitive economies do not
necessarily converge to the “correct” capital stock. Indeed, Diamond (1965) demonstrated that a
competitive economy can reach a steady state in which there is “too much” capital, in the sense that
the economy is investing more than it is earning in profit. In this case, individuals can be made
better off if they are forced to consume a portion of the capital stock. When evaluating investment
incentives, it is crucial for policy analysis to evaluate whether the economy is operating with “too
much” or “too little” capital.
26 Goolsbee (1995) argues that U.S. tax shocks are positively correlated with capital price
movements. The difference in the two sets of results arises from two sources. First, Goolsbee
uses the ITC as a measure of the tax change, rather than the fill user cost of
capital. Second, Goolsbee’s price regressions relate the level of the price to the level of the ITC,
while Hassett and Hubbard use the first-difference of the price (because the price series used are
highly nonstationary). When the model is estimated in levels, the uncorrected regression errors
contain unit roots.The classic “golden rule” literature offers benchmarks for guidance.27 In the golden rule
approach of Phelps (196 1), the golden rule level of the capital stock relative to output is achieved
when the marginal product of capital (R) net of depreciation (5) equals the sum of the rate of growth
of the labor force (n) and the rate of labor-augmenting technical change ~), or:
R=6+n+g. (15)
Alternatively, in the optimal growth literature, Ramsey (1928) golden rule levels require that the
marginal product of capital net of depreciation equal the sum of the social rate of time preference
(p) and the elasticity of marginal social utility with respect to per capita consumption (0) OPS
R=6+P+(#)g. (16)
Depending on the values of p and (#),the Ramsey golden-rule levels of capital can be less than the
Phelps golden-rule levels.
Following the conventional in neoclassical models of the capital stock, we assume a Cobb-
Douglas technology, so that the ratio of the steady-state golden-rule capital stock (K*) to output (~
eqtis the ratio of capital’s share in output (a) to the marginal product of capital (R). Moreover, the
golden tie level of net investment (~ relative to output equals (n + g) times the capital-output ratio.
27 Another argument for subsidies to equipment investment has been advanced by Judd
(1995), who concludes that the optimal tax on equipment investment is negative. He argues that,
to the extent that capital-goods-producing industries are imperfectly competitive (owing, say, to
the presence of patents), equipment prices contain significant markups. Hence to return firms’
input mix to the optimal level, the government should design an investment subsidy that equates
the price paid for equipment to its marginal cost.









One can account for different types of capital by noting that, in equilibrium, the net rates of return
on the alternative types are equal. Hence one can substitute into (17) measures of a~ for each type
of capital k and the relevant R (given differences in depreciation), and solve for the golden rule levels
of the capital stocks.
Using a range of parameter values in the golden rule expressionsin(17) and (18), Cohen,
Hassett, and Kennedy (1995) compare golden rule and actual levels of the capital stock or net
investment relative to output to their acti values over the period from 1980-1994. Table 2, which
we excerpt from several tables in that study indicates that for benchmark parameter values,
equipment investment and capital stocks are below their golden rule levels (assuming 1980-1994 is
sufficiently long to characterize a steady state), while residential investment and the residential
capital stocks -- which have received significant tax subsidies over this time period -- are near or
above their golden rule levels. Cohen, Hassett, and Kemedy also show that these conclusions are
not changes if the key parameters are allowed to vary across a broad range of plausible values.37
Alternatively, several authors have attempted to evaluate the optimality of the U.S. capital
stock by relating various interest rates to the rate of economic growth. One the one hand, Tobin
(1965), Solow (1970), and Feldstein (1977) argue that the maginal productivity of capital one
obtains from accounting profits estimates is about 10 percent, and thus conclude that the economy
is dynamically efficient. On the other hand, Ibbotson (1987) calculates a mean return on U.S.
Treasury bills from 1926-1986 of only 0.3 percent, suggesting dynamic inefficiency. The answer
to the question using interest rates depends critically on assessing the impact of risk, of course.
Abel, Mankiw, Summers, and Zeckhauser (1989) pursue an alternative strategy for
evaluating whether the U.S. capital stock is greater or less than the optimal level. In a stochastic
setting with a very general production technology, they demonstrate that an economy is dynamically
inefficient if it invests more than the returns from capital. They show that the economy is
dynamically efficient -- and hence in the range in which stimulative tax policy might have positive
social returns -- if the returns from capital exceed investment. Using their terminology, the key
question is whether the capital stock is on balance a “sW’ or a “spout.” This observation is a useti
contribution because it allows one to base judgment about dynamic efficiency on readily observable
cash flows. Abel, etal,conclude that the economy is dynamically efficient. Thus, both capital stock
data and “cash flow” data suggest that, by raising the stock of equipment capital, investment
incentives have positive social returns.29
C. Should We Use Temporary Investment Incentives?
The discussion thus fw pertains to permanent changes in investment incentives. Even a
‘9Because the golden rule models are developed for a closed economy, it is difficult to
extend the comparison to domestic versus foreign fixed capital.38
casual obsemation of the history of investment incentives since the 1950s suggests the usefulness
of considering temporary investment incentives. Since 1962, the mean duration of a typical state
in which an ITC is in effect has been about three and one-half years, and the mean duration of the
“no-ITC” state has been about the same length. Most recently, President Bush advocated a modified
ITC, known as
incremental ITC
the “Investment Tax Allowance” in 1992, and President Clinton proposed an
in early 1993; neither of these measures was enacted. What is the likely impact on
aggregate capital accumulation of temporary investment incentives?
Temporary investment incentives can have even larger short-run impacts on investment than
permanent investment incentives (see, e.g., Auerbach, 1989). Consider, for example, a temporary
ITC known to last for one period. The expression for the user cost of capital in equation (5)
indicates that the ITC lowers the current user cost both through its effect on r,,~ and through the
consequences of its removal on ri ,~+1,More generally, anticipated future changes in tax policy affect
the current value of the user cost and investment.
The large potential effects of tempor~ tax incentives on investment do not imply that they
are desirable tax policy -- even if one believes that long-run investment incentives are sound tax
policy. In the presence of uncertainty and adjustment costs, there is little reason to believe that
policymakers can “time” investment incentives for the purposes of stabilization policy. Moreover,
the use of temporary incentives increases uncertainty in business capital budgeting, making it more
difficult for firms to forecast the path of the user cost of capital.
D. Does Uncertain@ About Tax Policy Affect Investment?
What if firms do not know the exact timing of changes in investment incentives -- that is, if
tax policy is uncertain? There is a substantial literature evaluating the effects of price uncertaintyon investment, and the lesson from this literature is that the sign of the effect of uncertainty on
investment depends crucially on assumptions about adjustment costs and returns to scale. Hartman
(1972) shows that uncertainty generally increases investment in a model with constant returns and
convex adjustment costs. Abel (1983) derives a similar result in continuous time. Pindyck (1988),
however, shows that uncertainty can significantly lower capital formation if investment is
irreversible and if returns to scale are decreasing. We described Pindycks intuition earlier: In an
uncertain world, there is a gain to delaying investment -- the option value of waiting -- and these
gains are higher the higher is the variance in the output price.
Thus, one might be tempted to conclude from the early contributions to this literature that
the predicted effect of ti policy uncertainty will depend on what we believe about the reversibility
.- or lack thereof -- of capital investments. However, strictly speaking, tax policy uncertain y can
even increase investment in the models of H-an, Abel, and
1994, 1995).
This difference arises because tax policy uncertainty
important way. Researchers ofien introduced uncertainty by
Pindyck (see Ha.ssett and Metcalf,
is urdike
assuming
price uncertainty in an
that the price follows a
continuous-time random walk (Brownian motion or geometric Brownian motion). When prices
follow a random walk, the appropriate rational expectations forecast for the price at any time in the
future is today’s price, and the fiture path of the price is unbounded. Urdike most prices, t=
parameters tend to remain constant for a few years, arid then jump to new values. In addition, jumps
in the ITC tend to be mean-reverttig: When the credit is high, it is likely to be reduced in the fiture;
when the credit is low, it is likely to be increased in the future. Because of these properties, the
normal gain to waiting in a model with irreversibility is reduced significantly when an investment40
tax credit is “on”: Because the firm fears that the credit might be eliminated, it is more likely to
invest today while the credit is still effective. Hassett and Metcalf demonstrate that this effect
dominates the reverse effect in the state in which there is no investment tax credit, and conclude that
increasing tax policy uncertainty raises aggregate investment.
As with the case of temporary investment incentives generally, this result does not imply that
random tax policy is desirable. Most existing studies analyze investment in a partial equilibrium
setting wherein there are no utility costs to bunching capital formation. In a general equilibrium
setting, Bizer and Judd (1989) show that welfme is reduced significantly by random investment tax
policy. The randomness has a negative impact because consumers wish to smooth consumption, and
fluctuations in investment credits make smoothing costly.
VI. Policy Implications
Our finding of significant short-term and long-term effects of the user cost of capital on
equipment investment suggests applications to current policy debates. In particular, we evaluate in
this section consequences for the user cost and investment of a reduction in inflation and a switch
from a income tax to a broad-based consumption tax.
A. Low In~ation as a “Costless” Investment Subsidy
Many economists (see, e.g., Feldstein, 1976; and King and Fullerton, 1984) have argued that
under fairly general assumptions, a reduction in the rate of inflation provides a
stimulus to business fixed investment by reducing the user cost of capital.
relatively costless
Returning to the
expression for the user cost, there are two channels through which expected inflation affects
investment decisions. First, for given values of r and 5, the user cost varies positively with the level
of expected inflation n because the present value of depreciation allowances — which is formed‘/
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using the nominal rate, r + n, as a discount rate — varies inversely with inflation owing to
historical-cost depreciation.30 Second, inflation affects the real cost of finds, r. In this section, we
briefly illustrate this second channel (following Auerbach, 1983b), and calculate the extent to which
lower inflation over the past decade had led to a reduction in the user cost of capital.
In a small open economy, the real cost of debt would be determined in world capital markets,
and would be exogenously given to firms. If the capital market were closed, then the marginal tax
rate of the holder of debt would affect the interest rates that firms pay. That is, local debtholders
require a fixed real afier-tax return, r, where:
r= i (1 -Tp) - 7C, (19)
where i is the nominal interest rate on corporate debt, ~Pis the marginal personal tax rate on interest
income, and x is the expected rate of inflation. The inflation premium component of interest income
is taxable to bondholders. The fro’s real cost of debt, p~, depends on its own marginal income tax
rate, ~C:
Pd = i(l-~C) - n, (20)
because under current U.S. tax law nominal interest payments on corporate debt are fi.dly deductible.
Combining the two previous expressions relates the fms real cost of debt to the investor’s required
30That is, the present value of depreciation allowances is given by:
where DEP (a) is the depreciation allowance permitted an asset of age a, discounted at a
nominal rate that includes the expected inflation rate n.42








The firm’s real cost of equity finance, p., is defined as:
P, .D~E-~, ; (23)
where D is the dividend-price ratio and E is investors’ required ex-dividend nominal return to equity.
Note that, for a given r, inflation has very little effect on the cost of debt finance if--as is
likely the cme in the United States -- rCis approximately equal to rP. In this case, lower inflation
reduces the nominal interest deduction but lowers the tax liability of bondholders by the same
amount. Note also that the effects of inflation on the cost of debt finance depend crucially on the
assumption that the marginal debt holder is taxable. If the marginal debtholder is a pension fund
(whose income is not taxed under current law), then lower inflation unambiguously increases the
cost of debt finance.
offsetting reduction
Firms receive smaller interest deductions, and pension fids do not accrue an
in tax liability .31
31There is no clear consensus regarding the effects of marginal tax rates on domestic real
interest rates, or on the question of whether the “Fisher effect” implicit in equation (21) holds.
This is an important area for future research in this context.43
Individuals receive the afier-tax real return:
pi = (l-Ti)D + (1-C)E - n. (21)
where ri is the individual’s marginal tax rate on dividend income, and c is the individual’s accrual
equivalent tax rate on capital gains. Combining terms, the firm’s real cost of equity finance is:
(Ti -c) ~ + pi c
Pe=— — + — n.
(1 -c) (1 -c) (1 -c)
(22)
Higher inflation unambiguously increases the cost of equity finance by the factor c/(1-c).
This term captures the “inflation tax” paid by shareholders who reqeive purely nominal gains;
taxation of real capital gains would eliminate this effect. 32
The total real cost of investment tids is simply the weighted average of the cost of equity
and the cost of debt, where the weights are the share of each in marginal finmce. Using this
approach, one can examine the effect on investment of recent declines in expected inflation. Cohen,
Hassett, and Hubbard (1996) calculate the marginal effects on the user cost of lowering inflation.33
32For the calculations described below, we do not include the first term reflecting the tax on
dividends. In effect, we adopt the “tax capitalization” view of equity taxation (summarized in
Auerbach, 1983b) which suggests that the relevant tax rate is the effective capital gains tax rate,
regardless of the amount of dividends paid. This view assumes that marginal equity funds come
primarily from retained earnings rather than from new share issues and that earnings distributions
to shareholders are primarily through dividends rather than share repurchases.
33 Earlier empirical studies of the effect of inflation on real business tax burdens include
Feldstein and Summers (1977) and Auerbach (1983 b). Cohen, Hassett, and Hubbard (1996)
also allow for inflation to increase taxes paid because of the effects of inflation on the cost of
carrying inventones.,.
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They estimate that, under plausible assumptions, the current value of the user cost for equipment
investment is about 0.22, and they conclude that a one-percentage-point permanent decrease in
inflation lowers the user cost by about one-half a percentage point. In their calculations, the
incremental effect of each additional percentage point reduction in inflation is approximately the
same. Thus if the aual inflation rate were reduced from four percent to zero, the user cost of
capital would decline about two percentage points -- proportionally by about ten percent. Given the
elasticity estimates reviewed in the previous section, this “tax cut” would provide a significant
stimulus to investment.
B. Moving to a Consu~tion Tax
Under the income tax, the user cost of capital is itiuenced by the corporate tax rate,
investment tax credits, and the present value of depreciation allowances (see equation (4)). Under
a broad-based consumption tax, firms pay tax on the difference between receipts and purchases from
other firms. That is,
case (assuming that
simplifies to:
there is no investment tax credit, and investment is expensed (z= 1). In this
the corporate tax rate does not change over time), the user cost of capital
AP,+,
Cit = p,[r, +h - —l-
Pt (4’)
Comparing the user cost expressions in (4) and (4’) leads to two observations. First, under
a consumption tax, taxes do not distort business investment decisions; investment decisions are
breed on nonta.x tidarnentals. Second, given current U.S. tax policy, the user cost is lower under
a consumption tax than under an income tax..,.
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By how much? Under current law, and assuming that the output price and the capital goods
price are both equal to unity, then for assets with seven-year lives, (assuming that the expected real
interest rate is four percent, the expected inflation rate is three percent, and the marginal machine
is financed half with equity and half with debt), the value of (1-r)/(1-~) under 1996 U.S. tax law is
1.148, and the user cost of capital is equal to 0.234. The move to the consumption tax would lower
the value of the user cost to 0.205, a reduction that would lead, celerisparibus, to about a 10 percent
increase in equipment investment given the consensus estimates of y in equation (14).
Of course, other aggregate variables are also likely to change in response to such a large
change to the tax code were adopted. For example, nominal interest rates and the supply of savings
are likely to change. While it is difflcdt to say how Iwge, the net stimvlus to investment would be,
the consensus of the recent investment literature suggests that the partial equilibrium impact on
investment may be quite large.
VII. Conclusions
Economists and policymakers have long been concerned about the effects of business
taxation and investment incentives on the equilibrium capital stock and the timing of investment.
Such concerns figure prominently in research programs: (1) identifying impac~ of tax parameters
on fundamental determinants of investment; (2) describing links between fundamentals and the
capital stock or investment; and (3) testing models of those links. Studies within the neoclassical
tradition offer rigorous applications of(1) and (2), but, until recently, have not produced reasonable
empirical estimates of effects of fidamental on investment. Indeed, the poor empirical performance
of neoclassical factors led some researchers to conclude that “taxes don’t matter” and still others to
question assumptions of the neoclassical paradigm.‘)
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Our principal conclusions are four. First, neoclassical models that use convex costs of
adjusting the capital stock to derive investment equations yield economically important short-run
and long-run effects of tax policy on investment. This result reflects recent research which, through
a number of complementary approaches, demonstrates that measurement error in tidamentals
biases downward conventional estimates of tax effects. Second, at least for data on firm-level
investment, predictions of models with nonconvex adjustment costs are no more consistent with
observed links between fidarnentals and investment than those of models with convex adjustment
costs. Third, recent studies conclude that U.S. business investment is below its “golden rule” level.
Finally, consensus estimates of the impact of the user cost of capital on investment indicate that two
cment policy suggestions -- pursuing a monetary policy that would ryduce expected inflation and
switching from an income tax to a consumption tax -- would significantly stimulate investment.
The current state of research on business investment decisions suggests the desirability of
developing tests to distinguish among alternative models of costs of adjusting the capital stock.
Different adjustment cost specifications imply different time paths of the response of the capital
stock to tax policy, making such tests usefil for policymakers. Nonetheless, most recent studies
imply a high long-run elasticity of the capital stock to the user cost of capital, so that tax policy
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Estimties of Tax-Adjusted Q Model for FourteenCountries’
‘Y
Country Conventional Panel Data Estimated Coefficient with Contem-


























United Kingdom 0.062 0.589
(0.013) (0.078)
United States 0.048 0.650
(0.006) (0.077)
Notes: a Source: Calculations in Curnmins, Hassett, and Hubbard (1996) using Global Vantage data.
b See Table 5 in Cummins, Hass~ and Hubbard (1996), GMMestimates.instrumentsincludetwice-and
thrice-lagged values of Q, (//K), and the ratios of cash flow to capital.
c See Table 7 in Cummins, Hmsett, and Hubbard (1996), GMMestimates. Instruments include twice- and
thrice-lagged values of (//~ and the ratio of cash flow to capital, twice-lagged value nontax components of q, and
contemporaneous values of tax parameters.Benchmark Golden-Rule and Actual Levels of F’/Y and WY
Type of Capital Golden-Rule Level Actual Level
Phelps Ramsey (1980-1994 average)
Net Investment as Percent of GDP:
Total fixed 8.3% 6.0% 4.2%
Business fixed 4.8 3.6 2.4
Producers durable
equipment 2.4 2.0 1.3
Nonresidential structures 2.0 1.3 1.2
Residential 2.7 1.6 1,8
Ratio of Capital Stock to GDP:
Total fixed 3.3 2.4 1.9
Business fixed 1.9 1.4 1.0
Producers durable
equipment 1.0 0.8 0.5
Nonresidential structures 0.8 0.5 0.5
Residential 1.1 0.6 0.9
Source: Cohen, Hassett, and Kemedy (1995, Table 2).
Note: Benchmark parameter values are:
Labor force growth rate = 0.01
Rate of labor-augmenting technical change = 0.15
Social discount rate =0, 12
Social intefiemporal elasticity of substitution (~)= 3
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Murcc: Aulhors” calculauons based upon dala from [he Bureau of ECommk Analysis.
989
a. llle [ax wedge IS cticulal~ from r. which is [hc sum Of ine pmSCOI value of lax wvin~ from depreciation
diowances and Ihe invfi[~nl tax cmdi[. Higher VXJUCS for ( I - n ~~ 10 highw after-lax COSIS of investing.
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